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Abstract
This review of women’s participation in the legal system as expert witnesses examines 
the empirical literature on the perceived credibility and persuasiveness of women com-
pared with men experts. The effects of expert gender are complex and sometimes depend 
on the circumstances of the case. Some studies find no differences, some find favorable ef-
fects for women and others for men, and still others find that expert gender interacts with 
other circumstances of the case. The findings are interpreted through social role theory 
and the role incongruity theory of prejudice. Future directions for research are identified 
and implications are considered for attorneys who select and prepare expert witnesses. 
Suggestions for men’s and women’s behavior as expert witnesses are provided. 
Who makes a better expert witness: a man or a woman? This review is motivated by the 
historical concern that women may not have the same “expert power” as men. Attor-
neys seem to think jurors regard men as more credible experts than women and they may 
prefer to retain men as expert witnesses (Memon & Shuman, 1998). And indeed, gender 
studies often show that men are more influential than women, partly because they are 
viewed as more credible sources of information (see, e.g., Helgeson, 2009). Whether or not 
expert gender affects trial outcome is, however, an empirical question. The present paper 
reviews the literature to address two questions: does an expert’s gender affect jurors’ and 
judges’ perceptions of his or her credibility? And if so, does it make a difference in triers’-
of-fact ultimate decisions?
This analysis begins with an overview of current theories about gender, gender stereo-
types and roles, and prejudice, as well as the social psychological literature on the inter-
personal influence of men and women. This theoretical background is important because 
it provides the foundation for understanding empirical findings regarding the effects of 
expert witness gender. Before detailing the data regarding men and women experts, the 
historical context of women’s and men’s involvement in the courts is reviewed. Finally, 
this review ends with a discussion that provides directions for future research, considers 
implications for attorneys who select and prepare expert witnesses, and provides sugges-
tions to men and women experts about what behaviors they might engage in to maximize 
their credibility.
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Stereotypes and Gender Roles
Consider this description of a famous person: 
This individual is an accomplished 20th-century political figure who, prior to entering poli-
tics, worked as a research chemist and as a tax attorney.
Who is this person? Can you picture the person? Now read this description of a famous 
person: 
This internationally recognized public figure was known to be a loving and involved parent, 
and had gained a reputation for always being well-coiffed and tastefully dressed.
Who might this person be? Can you picture this person? Is the person in the second 
description unlike the person in the first? Could they possibly be the same person? You 
might be surprised that both passages refer to Britain’s former Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher (descriptions and example from Helgeson, 2009).
If it did not occur to you that both passages described the same person, it is because 
the first passage fits a male gender-role stereotype, whereas the second fits a female gen-
der-role stereotype. A stereotype is a set of beliefs or expectations about a certain group 
of people. Gender-role stereotypes are the expectations we hold about what women and 
men should be like, features we assign them due to the social roles they hold in our soci-
ety (Helgeson, 2009).
But what makes up a stereotype of a man or a woman? Broverman, Vogel, Brover-
man, Clarkson, and Rosenkrantz (1972) assessed people’s perceptions of masculine and 
feminine behavior and found strong agreement about the characteristics people associate 
with men and women. They presented descriptive words and phrases to people, asking 
them to rate to what degree each was characteristic of men or women (e.g., aggressive-
ness, talkativeness).
Broverman et al. (1972) defined a stereotypical feature as any aspect that 75% or more 
of men and women agreed described one gender more than the other. This rule led to 41 
items differentiating male from female gender stereotypes. The male stereotypes revolved 
around competence, assertion, and rationality, whereas female stereotypes focused on 
warmth and expressiveness. For example, masculine features included items like “very 
logical,” “can make decisions easily,” “almost always acts as a leader,” and “easily able 
to separate feelings from ideas.” The corresponding feminine features were the opposite: 
“very illogical,” “has difficulty making decisions,” “almost never acts as a leader,” and 
“unable to separate feelings from ideas” (Broverman et al., 1972; Helgeson, 2009).
Which set of descriptors seems more socially desirable? As you might expect, the mas-
culine characteristics are more highly valued than the feminine characteristics (Broverman 
et al., 1972; Eagly & Kite, 1987; Helgeson, 2009). For instance, one study demonstrated that 
masculine characteristics were rated as healthier by mental health professionals than femi-
nine characteristics (Broverman et al., 1972). Another study indicated that people’s stereo-
types of entire nations were more similar to stereotypes of the nation’s men than those of 
the women, again demonstrating the superiority of “masculine” traits (Eagly & Kite, 1987).
Social Role Theory
Eagly (1987) built on the findings about gender stereotypes described in the preceding 
section in developing a comprehensive theory about gender and social roles. Her so-
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cial role theory posits that people have different expectations for how men and women 
should behave. Women are expected to be more warm and communal than men; that is, 
more emotionally expressive, interpersonally sensitive, and concerned about others. Men 
are expected to be more competent and agentic than women; more controlling, indepen-
dent, and assertive (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004). Men and women who violate these ex-
pectations may be perceived negatively and may experience prejudice.
The Role Incongruity Theory of Prejudice
Prejudice was defined by Allport (1954) as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and in-
flexible generalization” toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he or 
she belongs to that group (p. 9). This static definition of prejudice was widely accepted 
and became the consensual view of prejudice in social psychology for many years. How-
ever, Alice Eagly and her colleagues (e.g., Eagly, 2004; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly & 
Karau, 2002; Eagly & Koenig, 2008) critiqued the definition, arguing that the static ap-
proach was not sufficient to encompass the complexities of prejudice. She and her col-
leagues asserted that people who experience discrimination may not belong to groups 
who elicit generalized negative attitudes. For instance, people generally hold positive atti-
tudes toward women even though women are targets of discrimination in many contexts.
Eagly and colleagues (Eagly, 2004; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Ea-
gly & Koenig, 2008) developed an expanded theory of prejudice that rests upon the idea 
of role incongruity – that prejudice results from a mismatch between stereotypes about a 
person’s group and beliefs about what is needed to succeed in a given social role. Rather 
than prejudice reflecting a static phenomenon, it is contextual and emerges in some situa-
tions but not in others.
When members of a group enter or attempt to enter roles that are stereotypically 
mismatched to characteristics ascribed to their group, prejudice may occur (Eagly 
& Koenig, 2008). The key eliciting condition for prejudice is the degree of incongru-
ity: the greater the mismatch between the group stereotype and the role requirements, 
the greater the prejudice is likely to be. Eagly and Koenig (2008) described how, even 
though an individual person might be evaluated favorably in a given role, the evalu-
ations could still be prejudicial. This is because the evaluation of the particular well-
liked (but role-incongruent) person may still be lower than evaluations of stereotypi-
cally matched individuals.
For example, consider a female chief financial officer of a large corporation. She would 
most likely elicit a positive attitude, given the prestige of her role, but the strength of the 
positive attitude would likely be less than that for an equivalent male executive (Eagly & 
Koenig, 2008). The less positive attitude would be revealed by downward shifts in beliefs 
held about her (e.g., she is not competitive enough), emotions toward her (e.g., anxiety 
that she might not negotiate well enough), and behaviors (e.g., reticence to give her the 
most important assignments). The phenomenon in this example occurs due to the conflict 
between the stereotypes associated with women—warmth, caring, sensitivity—and the 
more aggressive, competitive, agentic stereotypes associated with the masculine role she 
occupies (Eagly & Koenig, 2008).
Gender and Interpersonal Influence
In line with what social role theory and the role incongruity of prejudice would predict, 
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studies have shown that men may be more influential and persuasive than women, es-
pecially in masculine roles (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Helgeson, 2009). Should 
women in masculine roles adopt masculine behaviors to increase their influence? The an-
swer appears to be no. Several studies (Buttner & McEnally, 1996; Carli, 1990; Reid, Kee-
rie, & Palomares, 2003), including a meta-analysis (Eagly et al., 1992), have shown that 
women who act like men when in masculine or leadership roles (e.g., assertive language, 
dominant or directive interpersonal style) are perceived negatively compared with their 
male counterparts. The devaluation of women in these circumstances is greatest when the 
evaluators are men (Carli, 1990; Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995; Eagly et al., 1992; Matsch-
iner & Murnen, 1999; Reid et al., 2003).
For instance, Carli (1990) asked college students to listen to a man or woman deliver 
an audiotaped speech arguing for a bus fare increase, an issue about which all respon-
dents initially disagreed. Male respondents were more persuaded by women who used 
tentative speech, including tag questions, hedges, and disclaimers as compared with as-
sertive speech, but women were more persuaded by women who used assertive speech. 
The male speaker’s style did not make a difference to how persuasive he was: he was per-
suasive to both men and women either way. Although male evaluators were more re-
ceptive to the influence of non-assertive women who acted in traditional or stereotypical 
ways, they still judged these women as less competent and knowledgeable than asser-
tive and non-traditional women (e.g., Carli, 1990; Matschiner & Murnen, 1999). Carli et al. 
(1995) found that the likeability of a female speaker led to increased influence but only for 
male respondents; again, men seem to be more influenced by women who use a feminine 
rather than a masculine style of speaking. Thus, women may face a dilemma when they 
are expected to behave submissively but the situation requires assertive skills to succeed.
These background theories and social psychological bodies of research are critical to 
understanding how women experts may be perceived in the courtroom. Is being an “ex-
pert witness” perceived as a masculine social role? If so, how might women fare in this 
gender-incongruent social role? Would social role theory hold that she should show femi-
nine traits, or should she adopt masculine characteristics while serving in this role? These 
and other questions will be answered as we review data about women’s involvement in 
the courts and studies that have focused on questions like these.
Gender in the Court
Women have not always been welcome to participate in the legal process; in fact, histori-
cally, women were excluded from access to every role in the courts and were subjected to 
systematic negative biases in every facet of the legal process (Goodman-Delahunty, 1998; 
Price, Recupero, Strong, & Gutheil, 2004; Walters, 1994). This exclusion was based on the 
notion that women lacked the required physical fortitude and discerning intellect and 
would “skew the otherwise reliable fact-finding process” (Babcock, 1993, p. 1168). These 
attitudes reflected the social consensus at the time that women’s place was in the home. 
For instance, in the 19th century, physicians and educators warned that young women 
who studied long, hard hours would badly damage their reproductive systems and per-
haps go insane (Distant, 1875; Fausto-Sterling, 1992; Maudsley, 1874).
The boundaries of women’s social roles have changed over time. The courts now offi-
cially view gender discrimination and bias as adversely affecting the quality of the fact-
finding mission of the courts (Walters, 1994). However, surveys have continued to find 
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that professional women within the court system report experiencing gender discrimina-
tion (e.g., Price et al., 2004; Riger, Foster-Fishman, Nelson-Kuna, & Curran, 1995). Price et 
al. (2004) surveyed forensic psychiatry expert witnesses about perceptions of gender bias 
in the courts, finding that women experts were almost twice as likely as men to believe 
that gender is a factor in the selection of an expert witnesses (80% vs. 41%; odds ratio = 
5.8). Although sometimes male experts were preferred, the women also reported that at-
torneys at times explicitly told them they wanted a woman expert because they thought 
it would help their case. For example, in cases involving sexual harassment and rape, de-
fense attorneys might retain women experts to bolster the credibility of male defendants 
(Price et al., 2004).
In the 1980s and 1990s, several state and federal courts commissioned studies on gen-
der-based discrimination in the courts. The Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for 
Gender Fairness in the Courts (1989), for example, found that 55% of female attorneys, 
compared with 13% of male attorneys, believed judges assigned more credibility to male 
than to female expert witnesses. Studies examining gender bias in the Ninth Circuit and 
by the Texas Supreme Court found that, whereas male attorneys and judges generally be-
lieved gender prejudice had virtually disappeared over time, their female counterparts 
reported many continuing areas of bias (Coughenour et al., 1994; Texas Supreme Court 
Gender Bias Task Force, 2004).
Other gender biases identified by the Texas Supreme Court Gender Bias Task Force 
(2004) and by Riger et al. (1995) included attorneys addressing female expert witnesses 
with patronizing language and improper titles (e.g., Ms. instead of Dr.) and judges expect-
ing greater credentials before qualifying women as expert witnesses compared with men in 
the same profession. The latter example is consistent with the role incongruity theory de-
scribed earlier. Given that courtroom roles were traditionally masculine domains, women 
who enter the expert witness role may face a double standard in terms of how competent 
they must be to successfully participate in the court process (see also Foschi, 2000).
These data raise questions about the degree to which women are retained as experts 
compared with men, and whether women expert witnesses can be as effective as their male 
counterparts. Walters (1994) answered the first question by examining federal case law 
opinions for cases between 1980 and 1993 in the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Her findings showed that women appeared 
infrequently as experts in comparison to men, making up 11% of experts identified in writ-
ten court opinions and testifying in 21% of cases overall. However, because of the longitu-
dinal nature of her data, she was also able to show that more women experts were being 
retained in the later years of the analysis than in the earlier years. This trend has likely con-
tinued in the years since 1994. Several other studies have investigated the second question, 
whether women experts can be as effective as men, by examining their perceived credibility 
and effects on trier-of-fact decision-making. We now turn to those studies.
Effects of Expert Witness Gender
Prior research has found inconsistencies in whether expert gender affects perceptions of 
expert witness credibility and persuasion: sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn’t. 
As gender researchers have found in many other domains, context is critically important 
for understanding how women and men will be perceived (e.g., Eagly & Diekman, 2005; 
Goodman-Delahunty, 1998). Although main effects have emerged in some studies of ex-
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pert witness gender, interactions emerge in most others. Null findings are reviewed first, 
followed by main effect findings (e.g., either favoring men or women outright), followed 
by studies that have identified boundary conditions showing when and how expert gen-
der interacts with other aspects of cases (e.g., favoring men under some conditions and 
favoring women in others).
Null Findings
Some studies have found that expert gender does not affect credibility, suggesting that it 
may make no difference to a case whether a woman or a man expert witness is retained 
(e.g., Memon & Shuman, 1998; Titcomb-Parrott, Neal, Wilson, & Brodsky, in press; Von-
dergeest, Honts, & Devitt, 1993). For example, Vondergeest et al. (1993) found that expert 
gender did not affect mock jurors’ verdicts in an armed robbery trial in which the expert 
witness testified about conducting a polygraph examination of the defendant. However, 
the Vondergeest et al. (1993) study may have included a relatively weak manipulation of 
expert gender, as the transcripts were written and the manipulation included only a de-
scription of the expert as either a “he” or a “she.” Memon and Shuman (1998) also found 
no differences based on expert gender despite an arguably stronger manipulation. They 
showed photographs of their male and female expert witnesses while an audio presenta-
tion of the trial transcript presented mock jurors with information about a civil medical 
malpractice suit. The authors noted in their “limitations” section that the gender manipu-
lation may have been weakened by the audio transcript, which was read by a male narra-
tor in both conditions.
Titcomb-Parrott et al. (in press) presented the trial transcript through a video tape, a 
medium through which even stronger gender cues were present, as visual, verbal, and 
non-verbal cues associated with gender were involved. This study involved a criminal 
trial in which a violent offender was facing potential capital punishment sentencing. The 
expert witness testified about the defendant’s likelihood of reoffending. Despite the stron-
ger manipulation of expert gender, these authors found it had no effect on, and did not 
interact with, other variables (e.g., knowledge) on perceptions of credibility or mock juror 
decisions.
Main Effect Findings
Main effect findings are straightforward and easy to interpret, but sometimes they can 
brush over underlying differences between contexts or situations if the context or situ-
ation is not accounted for in the analysis. Some main effect findings regarding men and 
women experts have been uncovered. For example, Larson and Brodsky (2010) exposed 
mock jurors to a videotaped summary of a criminal murder trial and an excerpt of a 
cross-examination of a forensic mental health expert. They found a main effect advan-
tage favoring male experts over female experts. Specifically, male experts were rated as 
more likeable, believable, trustworthy, confident, and credible than female experts in 
their study. The authors also examined whether non-intrusive cross-examination ver-
sus intrusive questions (i.e., “Have you ever cheated on your husband/wife, Doctor?”) 
would differentially affect how men and women experts were perceived. They found 
no interaction between expert gender and style of cross-examination questions on rat-
ings of the experts.
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A few studies have found a main effect advantage for women experts over their male 
counterparts. For example, Couch and Sigler (2002) presented mock jurors with a written 
summary of a civil case involving an automobile accident. The plaintiff’s evidence came 
from an automobile engineer who was either a male or female expert. The authors pre-
dicted that a female automotive engineer expert witness would not be as persuasive as 
a male one, a hypothesis that was not supported. Expert gender made no difference in 
terms of verdict. However, expert gender did affect the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded to the plaintiff, but in the opposite direction than predicted. Specifically, 
the female expert witness elicited more compensatory damages than did the male.
Swenson, Nash, and Roos (1984) asked mock jurors to listen to an audiotape of a sim-
ulated child custody hearing to evaluate the effects of expert witness gender. The testi-
mony concerned the witness’s opinion about the parents in the custody dispute. They 
found a trend suggesting that female expert witnesses may be judged as more expert 
than males. The trend favoring women might be influenced by the type of case—a case 
that took place in family court and involved family matters, a feminine type of domain 
(Walters, 1994). Swenson et al. (1984) tentatively suggested that the finding may be con-
sistent with gender-role stereotypes that women are better judges of the needs of chil-
dren than men.
Although these main effect findings do exist in the literature, it seems they do not rep-
resent well the whole story of expert gender effects. Rather, the story seems to lie more 
in the boundary conditions under which interactive effects, or contextual effects, emerge. 
That is, in some kinds of cases or situations, women systematically outperform men as ex-
perts. In other kinds of cases or situations, men systematically outperform women. Some 
of these contexts have been identified, which we review here. However, much work re-
mains to be done to further understand the conditions under which men and women can 
be powerful experts.
Contextual Interactions
The majority of the studies that have examined the effects of expert gender on persuasion 
and perceptions of credibility show more complexity than simple main effects. Some of 
these conditions include the gender “domain” of the case itself, the complexity of the in-
formation the expert needs to convey to the trier of fact, whether or not deliberation is re-
quired, the timing of the expert testimony, and the degree to which expectations for be-
havior are violated by experts. Examples of these kinds of studies are presented in the 
following sections. Although there are labels representing different kinds of contextual 
effects, several of these studies overlap and could fit under the other subtitles.
Domain of the Case
A series of studies examined the gender congruency of the case; that is, the congruency 
between the domain of the case and the experts’ gender (McKimmie, Newton, Terry, & 
Schuller, 2004; Schuller & Cripps, 1998; Schuller, Terry, & McKimmie, 2001). For exam-
ple, Schuller et al. (2001) presented men and women testifying as plaintiff experts in a 
civil antitrust price-fixing case, reflecting either the “masculine” field of construction (i.e., 
the supply of crushed rock to a road construction company) or the “feminine” women’s 
clothing industry (i.e., supply of fine cotton to a women’s clothing company). The authors 
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expected the woman expert to be more persuasive than the man in the female congruent 
case and the man to be more persuasive than the women in the male congruent case. Con-
sistent with predictions, the male expert was more persuasive in the male-dominated do-
main, but in the female-dominated domain, there was not a significant difference in dam-
ages awards.
Although Schuller et al.’s (2001) findings suggest that male experts have a differential 
advantage over women in male congruent cases but that women and men may be equally 
persuasive in “feminine” cases, other studies have found that women may in fact have a 
differential advantage over men in female congruent cases (e.g., McKimmie et al., 2004; 
Schuller & Cripps, 1998). One reason the woman may not have been as persuasive as ex-
pected in Schuller et al.’s (2001) feminine domain is because the testimony in this particu-
lar case revolved around price-fixing, a topic that may have been perceived as masculine.
Complexity of Testimony
A follow-up study by Schuller, Terry, and McKimmie (2005) investigated expert gen-
der and complexity of the experts’ testimony. They used the same antitrust price-fixing 
agreement civil case. They expected to find that the male expert would be more persua-
sive than the woman, but only when the testimony to be presented was complex. The re-
sults were consistent with the hypothesis; the man elicited higher damage awards for the 
plaintiff in the high-complexity condition. However, they also found (unexpectedly) that 
the woman elicited higher awards than the man in the low-complexity condition.
Effects of Deliberation
McKimmie et al. (2004) extended these findings into group discussions by having mock 
jurors deliberate before filling out the measures. The case again involved the price-fix-
ing allegation in either a male- or female-oriented domain (i.e., tire/automotive service 
business vs. cosmetics sales business) and the plaintiff expert testimony was provided 
by either a male or female expert witness. Mock jurors were asked initially to complete 
the measures independently and then to engage in a group deliberation in which they 
were asked to try to reach an agreement about the appropriate amount of damages to be 
awarded. After group discussion, they were asked to rate the same items they had rated 
prior to deliberation. Results indicated that experts whose gender was congruent with the 
case domain were more persuasive than incongruent experts (for men and women). They 
also found that group deliberation exaggerated these effects, which appeared to be medi-
ated through participants’ evaluations of the expert witness.
Timing of Expert Testimony
The impact of expert gender and timing of testimony was investigated by Schuller and 
Cripps (1998) in a simulated audiotaped homicide trial involving a battered woman 
who had killed her abuser and claimed self-defense. The authors examined timing of 
testimony because they hypothesized that hearing the expert testimony about battered 
woman syndrome before the defendant’s account would provide jurors with an orga-
nizing framework for understanding the battered woman’s perceptions and actions. The 
findings revealed that when the expert was a woman, mock jurors found the defendant’s 
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claim more believable, the defendant less responsible, the husband more responsible, and 
their verdicts were more lenient.
This effect was qualified, however, by a two-way interaction between expert gender 
and timing of testimony. When the expert testified early, participants were more likely to 
believe the defendant’s claim and hold the husband responsible, but only when the expert 
was female. When the testimony was presented late, expert gender and testimony had no 
effect on mock jurors’ ratings. The pattern of results suggests that female experts may be 
more favorable to a defendant’s battered woman syndrome case, particularly when the 
testimony is presented early. The authors speculated that “jurors may believe a woman 
has a better understanding of a battered woman’s position than a man, and thus the tes-
timony she conveys [may be] seen as more trustworthy than the identical testimony pro-
vided by a man” (Schuller & Cripps, 1998, p. 28).
Violations of Normative Expectations for Behavior
A series of studies has shown that expert gender may matter, but only when the expert 
somehow violates the trier-of-fact’s expectations for the expert’s behavior (Brodsky, Neal, 
Cramer, & Zeimke, 2009; Neal & Brodsky, 2008; Neal, Guadagno, Eno, & Brodsky, 2012). 
For example, Neal et al. (2012) found that experts who met threshold expectations of like-
ability and knowledge were not perceived differently based on their gender; however, 
when they were not likeable, male experts were perceived significantly more positively 
and were more persuasive than female experts. That is, likeability may be particularly im-
portant for women, but it may not matter much if male experts are unlikeable. These stud-
ies suggest that only women may fare poorly in the expert witness role if they are not per-
ceived as both likeable and competent. The authors took a social role theory perspective 
(Eagly, 1987) and suggested that the woman was in a masculine occupational role—an ex-
pert witness—but that her performance suffered when she violated normative gender ex-
pectations for likeability. This rationale was further supported by pilot studies finding that 
without the occupational role, participants evaluated images of the experts similarly.
Neal and Brodsky (2008) exposed mock jurors to a videotaped excerpt of an expert 
mental health witness testifying about a defendant’s likelihood of recidivism in a capital 
murder sentencing hearing. They varied the amount of eye contact the expert made with 
the mock jurors (i.e., by looking directly at the camera) and with the questioning attorney, 
with conditions of low, medium, and high eye contact. Based on previous literature about 
gender and non-verbal behavior norms, the authors expected the male experts to be rated 
as credible in the medium- and high-eye-contact conditions (but not in the passively low 
condition), and that the women would be rated as credible only in the medium conditions 
(not the low or the assertively high conditions). They also expected that men would be 
rated as more credible than women in the high-eye-contact condition.
Results provide information about the relative importance of eye contact for men and 
women expert witnesses: eye contact appears to be especially important for the credibil-
ity of male experts. Only male experts in the high-eye-contact condition had high credi-
bility ratings, whereas the female experts’ credibility was not affected by how much eye 
contact they made. These results suggest that it may not matter of what a female witness’s 
eye contact behavior is like, but that male experts should maintain high levels of eye con-
tact for maximum credibility.
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Discussion
The expert witness role appears to be a traditionally masculine social role, given the his-
torical exclusion of women from all aspects of the trial process. With time, the rigidity of 
this gendered role is relaxing, as more and more women participate as expert witnesses 
and in other roles in the trial process. Nevertheless, there remain potential consequences 
for women serving in this role. For example, in her analysis of federal court trials, Wal-
ters (1994) found that women testified infrequently as the sole expert for a party, account-
ing for only 7% of solo appearances. She explained, “This skewed ratio may indicate that 
litigants feel testimony by women must be supplemented to satisfy the same evidentiary 
burden” (p. 638). This finding is consistent with Eagly and colleagues’ role incongruity 
theory of prejudice (Eagly, 2004; Eagly & Diekman, 2005; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly & 
Koenig, 2008).
The role incongruity theory predicts that the greater the mismatch between the gender 
stereotype and the social role requirements, the greater the prejudice is likely to be (Eagly 
& Koenig, 2008). These consequences are most likely to occur in situations that heighten 
the salience of the incongruity between the female gender role and the masculine occupa-
tional role (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Consistent with this prediction, many of the studies re-
viewed in this paper demonstrate that the domain of the case and the experts’ area of ex-
pertise may matter.
For example, Walters (1994) found a discernible division of labor among experts along 
traditional gender lines. Women were more likely to participate in “human” disputes in-
volving education, family services, and social services. For instance, women experts ac-
counted for 75% of the experts involved in education controversies. By contrast, in mascu-
line domains such as economic controversies, female experts were virtually unrepresented. 
Women accounted for 4% of the experts in corporate cases and 0% of contract disputes.
Experimental studies demonstrated that men were more persuasive to mock jurors 
than women in “masculine” domain cases, such as price-fixing in the construction and 
tire/automotive service industries (McKimmie et al., 2004; Schuller et al., 2001). How-
ever, for cases requiring expert testimony pertaining to areas about which women may be 
perceived as more knowledgeable than men, such as child custody and battered women 
cases, some findings suggest that women may be somewhat more persuasive than men 
(e.g., McKimmie et al., 2004; Schuller & Cripps, 1998). Areas of expertise such as child cus-
tody and battered women may be seen as appropriate for women experts but less appro-
priate for men, and as a consequence, men’s testimony may be devalued in these kinds of 
cases (Schuller & Cripps, 1998).
Professional women may face a trade-off between their professional and gender role 
expectations (see Figure 1). If they fulfill gender role expectations, they may be perceived 
as less competent or powerful professionals, whereas if they adhere to their professional 
role expectations, they may violate gender role expectations and be perceived negatively 
as a woman (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2004; Eagly et al., 1992).
This dilemma stems from a conflict between the stereotypes associated with women—
warmth, caring, sensitivity—and the more aggressive, competitive, agentic stereotypes 
associated with the masculine role they occupy when they adopt the expert witness role 
(Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Koenig, 2008). Given this conflict, a woman is likely to face a double 
standard where she must meet the expectations required of her as a result of her gender, 
but must also meet (or more likely exceed) the expectations required for competence as 
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an expert witness. Many of the findings reviewed in this paper support these predictions, 
which emerge from both social role theory (Eagly, 1987) and the role incongruity theory 
of prejudice (e.g., Eagly & Koenig, 2008).
For example, judges sometimes required greater credentials of women before qualify-
ing them as experts compared with men in the same profession (Riger et al., 1995; Texas 
Supreme Court Gender Bias Task Force, 2004). Neal et al. (2012) showed that women ex-
perts must be not only competent but also likeable to be effective witnesses. By contrast, 
men did not have to be likeable in order to be persuasive experts—they only had to be 
competent.
Across these studies, gender stereotypes sometimes influenced perceptions of the ex-
perts, but were usually not determinative of the ultimate case decision (e.g., verdict, sen-
tence, damage awards). This is good news: peripheral variables such as expert gender 
should not determine triers of facts’ decisions. Rather, their decisions should be based on 
the content of testimony, the substance of a case, and the strength of evidence. A variable 
like expert witness gender is one of many pieces of information decision-makers must in-
tegrate in formulating a decision.
Although expert gender did not often affect ultimate decisions, it did affect percep-
tions of credibility. Credibility is an intermediate decision: it is not an ultimate legal deci-
sion, though it is certainly part of the process through which triers of fact reach their ulti-
mate decisions. In criminal cases where the ultimate decisions were categorical (i.e., guilt 
and sentencing), expert gender typically did not influence the ultimate decision. How-
ever, in civil cases where the ultimate decisions were continuous (i.e., damage awards), 
expert gender sometimes did influence the decision. These findings suggest that although 
stereotypes of men and women may influence intermediate judgments, ultimate decisions 
that are absolute categories may not be influenced as much by such stereotypic cues.
Directions for Future Research
Additional high-quality research can shed light on several remaining questions. For ex-
ample, what is the relative balance a woman expert should strive for in terms of demon-
strating feminine characteristics while serving in the “masculine” role of expert witness? 
Should she wear a skirt suit instead of a pant suit? Should she use tentative language? 
How should men experts behave in cases that are traditionally within the feminine do-
main of expertise? How might juror leaders who emerge as influential in jury delibera-
tions affect the perceptions of men and women experts?
Figure 1. A professional woman’s dilemma.
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The existing studies reviewed in this paper each have limitations, and thus research 
studies that use innovative methods or generate answers to creative questions that ad-
dress some of these limitations have the most potential to contribute meaningfully to this 
literature. For instance, most of the studies focused on the trial process itself, a rare event 
in the criminal justice process. Most cases are pled out or settle prior to this phase. How 
might expert gender affect a defendant’s likelihood of pleading guilty, or affect the likeli-
hood that a case will settle prior to trial? Another common limitation is that almost none 
of these studies examined the effects of jury deliberation, a reality of many trials. And the 
one study that did examine how the process of deliberation might diminish or exaggerate 
the effects of expert gender suggested that the deliberation process had a real impact on 
jurors’ decisions, which appeared to be mediated through participants’ evaluations of the 
expert (McKimmie et al., 2004).
Another remaining question is, “Might composition of the jury be relevant?” Some 
studies have suggested that the way jurors perceive male and female experts might be af-
fected by the jurors’ gender or the gender role stereotypes they hold. For instance, Schul-
ler and Cripps (1998) found that, among jurors, men seemed to be more persuaded than 
women by a woman expert in a battered woman syndrome case. Kovera, Levy, Borgida, 
and Penrod (1994) found that women jurors rated expert testimony more positively than 
men, judged the credibility of the expert more positively, found the testimony more help-
ful and important, and perceived psychological evidence to be more scientifically sound. 
By contrast, Memon and Shuman (1998) found no significant differences between men 
and women participants’ perceptions or ratings of male and female experts (though, 
again, they noted their manipulation may not have been very strong). Either way, it ap-
pears that more research can shed light on the conditions under which jurors might be 
more or less influenced by a source characteristic like expert gender. Perhaps question-
naires measuring sexism or gender role ideology might be useful for inclusion during 
jury selection procedures.
Might expert gender effects be stronger in cases with salient gender cues? The stud-
ies that looked at the domain of the case have begun to investigate this question, but there 
are perhaps other ways it might be addressed. For instance, a rape case or a child abuse 
case might elicit results in which both intermediate and ultimate judgments are affected 
by stereotypic cues. Future research should clarify under what conditions women and 
men experts might affect ultimate trial outcomes. Furthermore, we need research that will 
uncover how the courts might reduce the salience of expert gender cues or otherwise ef-
fectively cue decision-makers to correct for potential gender bias.
We already have some indication of how gender bias might be corrected. Take, for ex-
ample, Schuller et al.’s (2005) study, which found that men experts elicited higher dam-
age awards when the testimony was complex, but that women experts elicited higher 
damage awards when the testimony was not complex. This finding might be interpreted 
through Wegener and Petty’s (1997) flexible correction model. This model predicts that 
people will correct for their own perceived bias when they recognize potentially biasing 
cues, and that at times, people may overcorrect, which may manifest as bias in the oppo-
site direction. Perhaps the mock jurors exposed to complex testimony in Schuller et al. 
(2005) study were not cued about potential gender bias. But perhaps when they were ex-
posed to a woman expert, especially one testifying about simple matters, the jurors might 
have been cued to correct for potential bias against the woman. They might have thought 
something like, “I’m going to prove to the world that I’m not biased against women” and 
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over-adjusted their judgments accordingly, so that men were actually perceived as less 
persuasive than women in that low-complexity condition.
Couch and Sigler’s (2002) study showing that a female automobile engineer elicited 
higher damage awards than a male expert in a civil case may also have included a salient 
gender cue that highlighted the issue of potential gender bias and assisted mock jurors in 
(over)correcting their biased judgments. The research questions that remain are whether 
there were gender bias cues in these studies (and what they might have been), as well as 
how courts, judges, attorneys, and perhaps even experts themselves might cue triers of 
fact to correct (but not over-correct) for potential gender biases.
Implications for Men and Women Experts and  
Attorneys Selecting Experts
Although many questions about the expert power of men and women experts remain, 
some suggestions for men and women experts and for attorneys who retain them can be 
generated based on the data currently available. Note that as time passes and the bound-
aries of social roles change, many of these suggestions may become obsolete. Neverthe-
less, for now they may be useful to consider (although ironically, by writing these sugges-
tions I may be delaying progress in this area; I hope this is not the case).
The studies reviewed suggest that male experts may have a slight advantage overall 
in terms of perceived credibility and persuasiveness to jurors. However, there are sev-
eral situations in which this slight advantage is likely to disappear (or even invert, so that 
women have an advantage). Thus, attorneys might be well advised to consider the do-
main of the case. Does the case revolve around a traditionally masculine issue, like the 
construction industry, taxes, or contracts? If so, a male expert may have a slight advan-
tage (depending on the composition of the jury or the judge’s proclivities). If the case re-
volves around a traditionally feminine issue, like child custody or domestic violence, a 
female expert may have a slight advantage (again, depending on the trier of fact). Attor-
neys might also consider the complexity of the data that must be conveyed to the trier of 
fact. When the testimony is complex, men may have an advantage. When it is not com-
plex, women may have an advantage.
For both men and women, competence is an important prerequisite for credibility as 
an expert witness. However, both men and women experts may also need to attend to 
gender role expectations in order to maintain their perceived credibility as expert wit-
nesses. For example, for men, it appears that maintaining high levels of eye contact (“as-
sertive eye contact”) with whomever is asking questions and with the trier of fact is im-
portant for credibility (Neal & Brodsky, 2008). This requirement did not hold for women 
experts—women were perceived as credible whether they had low, medium, or high lev-
els of eye contact (Neal & Brodsky, 2008).
In contrast, likeability appears to be especially important for women experts, but does 
not appear to be as important for men experts (Brodsky et al., 2009; Neal et al., 2012). The 
studies that have examined expert witness likeability suggest that witnesses should strive 
to use informal speech, such as minimizing technical jargon, explaining key terms, and 
using the name of the defendant or plaintiff rather than referring to him or her as “the 
defendant” or “the plaintiff.” Experts attending to their likeability should also use mod-
est rather than excessively certain statements, be willing to smile on occasion, if appropri-
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ate to the situation or context, and use inclusive statements (e.g., the words “we” or “us” 
when discussing members of the scientific community; Brodsky et al., 2009; Neal et al., 
2012).
Women experts might also be mindful of the social psychological literature showing 
that women leaders are perceived negatively when they adopt masculine characteristics 
while serving in “masculine” roles. Given that the expert witness role is traditionally a 
masculine social role, the literature suggests that women who adopt the role should dem-
onstrate some feminine traits while in the role (e.g., Buttner & McEnally, 1996; Carli, 1990; 
Carli et al., 1995; Eagly et al., 1992; Reid et al., 2003). The particulars of how this might 
look are not well understood, and thus research is needed to shed light on this question 
as well. Might women who wear skirt suits instead of pant suits be perceived as more 
feminine, and thus be less likely to be penalized for violating traditional gender roles? 
How about women who are deferential and respectful in their speech on the stand? Or 
would this “submissive” speech style backfire and impair her perceived competence and 
persuasiveness? How might the answers to these questions depend, again, on the prefer-
ences or biases of the trier of fact?
In sum, the data available to date indicate there are some gender differences in how 
men and women experts may be perceived, but most of these differences are relatively 
small and contextually determined. The existing body of data provides some implications 
for how men and women experts might behave in order to maximize their perceived 
credibility, which has been reviewed here. Nevertheless, every expert witness is an indi-
vidual and each case is unique. Perceived credibility may vary by audience, case context, 
testimony material, and so forth. Thus, each new opportunity to hire an expert or to adopt 
the expert witness role is a fresh opportunity to learn and adjust to the environment.
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